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ABSTRACT. the recent sluggish recovery in the u.S. house market has further motivated our re-
search interests in overbuilding in real estate markets. our model is an extension to grenadier’s (1996), 
who emphasizes rational investment decisions possibly leading to oversupply in real estate markets, 
by further allowing for the important implication of irrational expectation for the strategic interaction 
amongst competing investors. In this model, two market participants are asymmetric because one of 
them is allowed to have heterogeneous expectations about the growth and volatility of demand shocks. 
unlike most of previous studies that only simply think of this phenomenon as a result of irrationality, 
our model further finds that irrational investors’ value-maximizing investment choices matter in un-
derstanding the strategic interaction of investment decisions in real estate markets, therefore providing 
additional insights into overbuilding and other puzzling phenomena in real estate markets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
overbuilding is a noteworthy phenomenon in the 
evolution of real estate markets that can usually 
be characterized as a cyclical boom-and-bust pat-
tern, and has attracted much attention from policy 
makers, market participants and researchers in 
the field of real estate. The recent serious crisis 
and sluggish recovery in the u.S. house industry 
even have further heightened our concerns over 
this phenomenon in real estate markets. for ex-
ample, Decoster and Strange (2012) highlight that 
there existed such category of phenomena in the 
uS house market over the past several years, and 
attempt to provide an exploratory interpretation 
for this phenomenon from the angle of herding be-
havior. However, while a few interpretations for 
overbuilding can be identified from the relevant 
literature, the phenomenon is still thought of as a 
puzzle (Wang, Zhou 2000; Bar-Ilan, Strange 1996). 
among these interpretations, a real options-based 
analytical approach is appealing, in that it not 
only allows for an uncertain investment environ-
ment but also a rational expectation for real estate 
market (grenadier 1996). Since overbuilding is of 
considerable importance to the academic research 
and practice of real estate markets, this paper at-
tempts to develop a real options-based model to 
investigate the puzzling phenomenon in real es-
tate markets by further incorporating heterogene-
ous expectations into this model as well as rational 
expectations. our research sheds new light on the 
strategic implication of this phenomenon.
In the standard real options approach, an op-
timal investment opportunity is usually regarded 
as an american call option, and investors can 
endogenously choose the timing of their optimal 
investments based on the analytical framework of 
american options in order to maximize the values 
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of their investment projects. under this frame-
work, an investment option should be exercised 
immediately when the value of the underlying 
state variable reaches the optimal investment 
threshold1. However, the practice of real-world 
investment competition suggests that optimal 
investment choices are usually not made in iso-
lation but, to a large extent, affected by various 
strategic interactions among competing inves-
tors. as a consequence, recent literature has paid 
special attention to the important implications of 
these strategic interactions within the real op-
tions framework. for example, Williams (1993) 
provides an earlier exploration for equilibrium 
investment strategies of real estate developers 
within a real options framework, while these 
developers are rational and their options are 
exercised simultaneously. grenadier (1996) fur-
ther allows for the sequential exercise strategies 
of real estate developers. In grenadier’s model, 
two symmetric investors are assumed to hold 
common, rational expectations on the demand 
evolution of the real estate market. grenadier’s 
model discusses both sequential and simultane-
ous exercise equilibriums, and therefore provides 
an interesting explanation for the phenomena of 
development cascade and overbuilding in real es-
tate markets. grenadier (2002) further looks at 
competitive exercise strategies amongst multi-
ple rational companies within a symmetric nash 
equilibrium framework2. However, these existing 
studies typically assume that all market partici-
pants have the same, rational, expectations and 
that they all can process correctly all relevant 
information obtained without costs and therefore 
predict the stochastic evolution of an underlying 
state variable using an identical model. In reality, 
however, these assumptions might not be a good 
approximation to investment problems in the real 
world.
a great deal of literature has highlighted that 
investors’ irrational expectations have impor-
tant implications for strategic market competi-
tion (e.g., De long et al. 1990, 1991; Kogan et al. 
2006). In real estate literature, irrational expecta-
tions have been found to have significant impacts 
on the price fluctuations of real estate markets 
(e.g., clayton 1996, 1997, 1998). More recent em-
1 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and trigeorgis (1996) for 
the detailed discussion on the standard real options 
models.
2 Smit and trigeorgis (2004) provide a comprehensive 
survey of this category of literature on game-theoretic 
option models (see also clapp et al. 2012).
pirical results have also shown that market par-
ticipants might have irrational perspectives on 
the expected growth and volatility of real estate-
related variables such as market demand. for 
example, glaeser et al. (2008) demonstrate that 
real estate bubbles might be, to a large extent, 
caused by the irrational market expectation de-
viating from rational market equilibrium. Mian 
and Sufi (2009) further provide evidence that the 
interaction of rational and excessive expectations 
for the u.S. housing market matters in inter-
preting the recent mortgage default crisis. More 
recently, Brueckner et al. (2012) highlight that 
mortgage lenders and borrowers could have dif-
ferent expectations on future house prices, which 
helps improve our understanding about the re-
cent housing bubble in the u.S. as a result, our 
model extends the real options-based approach to 
examine the important implications of irrational 
expectations for the puzzling real estate phenom-
ena of overbuilding and development cascade by 
allowing for irrational expectations on the growth 
and volatility of underlying demand variables in 
real estate markets. Development cascade is an-
other puzzling phenomenon that has significant 
influence on real estate cycles and has also been 
discussed in grenadier (1996). to our knowledge, 
little study has attempted to investigate the ef-
fects of irrational expectations on the strategic 
interaction amongst competing investors.
furthermore, competing investors usually are 
not identical or homogeneous in the real world, so 
a few recent real options studies, such as Pawli-
na and Kort (2006), Kong and Kwok (2007), and 
Wang and Zhou (2006), have begun relaxing the 
strict assumption that these investors are com-
pletely the same. among them, Wang and Zhou 
(2006) investigate optimal investment strategies in 
real estate markets allowing competitive develop-
ers to have different production capacities. their 
findings clearly show that the differences of pro-
duction capacities might delay these developers’ 
expected exercise time, implying the importance 
of investigating asymmetric competition in the 
analysis of investment strategies3. Similar to these 
studies, we also take asymmetric competition into 
consideration, while we allow market participants 
to have different expectations on the growth and 
volatility of underlying state variables.
3 See also Kong and Kwok (2007) and Pawlina and 
Kort (2006), who investigate the significant effects of 
asymmetry in both sunk costs and revenue flows on 
the strategic interaction of investment decisions in the 
duopoly context.
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the real estate development industry can be 
characterized as oligopolistic competition in many 
countries, because a few large powerful players 
play dominant roles in real estate development 
activities in these countries (e.g., ong et al. 2003; 
coiacetto 2009; lai et al. 2004). although duop-
oly, as a special form of oligopoly, might be sel-
dom found in the real world, it is usually regarded 
as an ideal model for examining the essence of 
oligopolistic market structure. as a result, many 
studies such as Dixit and Pindyck (1994), grena-
dier (1996) and nielsen (2002) have examined the 
strategic interplay of competitive investors based 
on an option-based duopoly model where both du-
opolists are identical firms. Subsequent research 
has further extended these studies by relaxing one 
or several assumptions (e.g., Pawlina, Kort 2006; 
Kong, Kwok 2007; Mason, Weeds 2010). Similar 
to these subsequent studies, we also develop a 
duopoly model while we relax the assumption on 
rational expectation in order to shed new light on 
the phenomena of overbuilding and development 
cascade in real estate markets. We allow one agent 
to have irrational expectation on real estate de-
mand, while the other still keeps the rational ex-
pectation. Such specification allows us to compare 
the differences between these two cases in order to 
highlight the important implications of irrational 
expectation.
rational expectations can be understood in the 
sense that all relevant information can be obtained 
to forecast the future values of economic variables 
of interest, and such forecasting does not produce 
systematic errors deviating from the market equi-
librium results (see, e.g., Sargent, Wallace 1976). 
Correspondingly, irrationality can be defined as 
deviations from the rational expectations. Irra-
tional expectations might be caused by asymmetric 
or heterogeneous information, even though inves-
tors are of homogeneous priors. for example, De 
long et al. (1990) show that different available in-
formation can result in two different categories of 
market participants, namely, rational arbitrageurs 
and irrational noise traders. these noise traders’ 
beliefs drive the significant deviation of asset 
market prices from their fundamental values, and 
therefore matter in interpreting financial market 
anomalies. garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) have 
demonstrated that some market participants hold 
superior information about the dynamics and con-
ditions of real estate markets. thus, our model as-
sumes that two developers can form their rational 
expectations about the future demands for their 
respective buildings based on all relevant informa-
tion, while they might collect limited information 
about their competitors. Specifically, one developer 
can form rational expectations regarding the fu-
ture demand for his competitor’s building as well 
as that for his own building. However, the other 
makes an irrational expectation on the future de-
mand for his competitor’s building, because this 
developer only holds limited information about his 
competitor4. as a result, both developers in our 
model have different expectations on the growth 
and volatility of underlying demand variables. We 
investigate the effects of the irrational expectations 
on these two developers’ investment exercise strat-
egies. grenadier (1996) has shown that strategic 
market competition can result in the puzzling phe-
nomena in real estate markets due to developers’ 
investment-maximizing behaviors and the threat 
of preemption by their competitors. However, our 
findings show that if one developer misperceives 
the expected growth and volatility of the demand 
for his competitor’s building and even if this devel-
oper follows the pattern of value-maximizing in-
vestment, this category of irrational expectations 
can still result in earlier or delayed investment 
and even excess supply in the real estate market. 
this suggests that “rational” choices of competi-
tive investors with irrational expectations might 
distort strategic competition equilibriums in real 
estate markets, and therefore increase uncertainty 
in these markets.
finally, real estate is a typical category of dif-
ferentiated products, which are characterized by 
their heterogeneity and immobility such that no 
two properties are the same. Because of the dif-
ferentiation of real estate in terms of location, 
structure or quality, real estate markets are usu-
ally found to be highly localized and segmented. 
also, the differentiation of real estate is even often 
utilized by its developers as a competitive strategy. 
thus, although the market demand for a certain 
category of buildings is the sum of their individu-
al demands, the demands across these competing 
buildings might not be simply substituted due to 
their possible low substitution degree. If we use 
only one single geometric Brownian motion process 
to describe the demands for these buildings, this 
actually implies that these demands are driven 
only by one common market process. Shaked and 
Sutton (1982) stress that in a duopoly market two 
competing firms can reduce price competition and 
4 In effect, even though a developer holds only a set of 
incomplete information, he is likely to use it as though 
it was a set of complete information (Hong et al. 2007).
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realize positive profits at Nash equilibrium by pro-
ducing differentiated products, therefore implying 
the importance of allowing for product differentia-
tion in the competitive market. for this reason, 
we assume that the demands for two buildings in 
a duopoly context evolve following their respec-
tive geometric Brownian motions in order to take 
product differentiation into consideration. this 
suggests that common demand in this market can 
be captured by the instantaneous correlation be-
tween these two processes, whereas idiosyncratic 
demand caused by the differentiation of these two 
buildings may be described by the non-correlation 
components of these two processes.
the remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 proposes a basic model framework. 
Section 3 derives two developers’ optimal invest-
ment thresholds and equilibrium exercise strate-
gies in the benchmark setting. In Section 4, we 
take account of the effects of irrational expecta-
tions on equilibrium investment strategies. Section 
5 conducts comparative static analysis. Section 6 
draws relevant conclusions.
2. MODEL SETTING
our model allows for a real estate market com-
posed of two buildings, which are respectively 
owned by two individuals, denoted i = 1, 2. for 
simplicity, suppose that these two pre-existing 
buildings are obsolete. these two owners have op-
portunities to undertake development for their re-
spective buildings in order to realize and enhance 
rental incomes from these two buildings. Suppose 
that developing a new building at any time will 
always incur a constant sunk cost 0I > , while the 
time-to-build is not taken into our consideration5. 
We also assume that these two market agents are 
in competitive positions, and have to consider their 
competitors’ development choices when deciding 
their own development strategies.
for the purpose of this study, we assume that 
these two agents might be of different expectations 
on market demand, while both of them are risk 
neutral and their redeveloped buildings have the 
same scale. let Q(t) represent the time-t supply of 
the redeveloped buildings in the market such that 
( ) (0,1,2)Q t ∈ . there exists a differentiable supply 
function [ ]D ⋅  satisfying / 0D Q∂ ∂ < , where D(1) 
5 grenadier (1996) and Wang and Zhou (2006) have 
taken account of the time spent on the construction of 
buildings in their real options models. It can be shown 
that consideration of the time-to-build will not provide 
additional insights into our model results.
and D(2) denote the supply conditions after only one building has been constructed and after both 
buildings have been developed completely, respec-
tively.
Suppose that rent flows generated by these two 
buildings are determined by the following inverse 
demand function6:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]i i iP t X t Y t D Q t= , {1,2}i ∈ , (1)
where: ( )iX t denotes the specific demand shock for 
agent 1’s building, believed by owner i , whereas 
Yi(t) represents the demand shock for agent 2’s 
building, believed by owner i. Such specification 
allows these two individuals to have heterogene-
ous perspectives on the demand processes. for ex-
positional convenience, however, we specify that 
( )iX t evolves randomly following the same pro-
cess for these two individuals in order to set up a 
benchmark case in this analysis. as a result, we 
can drop subscript i from ( )iX t . equation (1) can 
be rewritten as:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]i iP t X t Y t D Q t= . (2)
to consider the differentiation of these two 
buildings, the demand shock for agent 1’s building 
is specified to be governed by the following geomet-
ric Brownian motion:
dX Xdt XdB= µ + σ , (3)
where: μ and σ are given positive constants, and B 
denotes a standard Brownian motion. this speci-
fication implies that both agents have the same 
expectation on the growth and volatility of demand 
shocks for agent 1’s building.
However, the demand shock for agent 2’s build-
ing in agent i ’s perspective is believed to evolve in 
the following geometric Brownian motion:
i i i i idY Y dt c Y dW= α + , (4)
where: W is another standard Brownian motion 
with the correlation dBdW dt= ρ , and 0ρ < repre-
sents the instantaneous correlation coefficient be-
tween dB and dW.7 In this equation, the constant
iα represents the percentage change rate of ( )iY t  
6 Such specification closely follows Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994, Chapter 8), who define a similar functional form 
in considering two sources of demand uncertainty. Alter-
natively, we can also specify X and Y representing an 
industry-wide shock and firm-specific shock, respectively.
7 negative correlation, in effect, means negative exter-
nalities between two market agents, while positive 
correlation implies the contrary case. However, for 
simplicity, we only focus on the situation of negative ex-
ternalities, whereas it is easy to extend our model to 
allow for positive externalities. 
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expected by agent i, whereas the constant ci de-
notes the expected standard deviation, per unit of 
time, of ( )iY t in agent i’s belief. Such specification 
allows both agents to have different expectations 
on the growth rate and volatility of demand shocks 
for agent 2’s building, while the demand shock for 
this building in these two agents’ perspectives is 
being driven by the same innovation process W8.
3. BENCHMARK SETTING  
AND INVESTMENT THRESHOLDS
for ease of exposition, this section discusses a 
benchmark setting where both agents are as-
sumed to have the same expectation on the 
growth and volatility of demand shocks for build-
ing 2. Similar to Kong and Kwok (2007), we take 
account of three categories of competitive equilib-
riums – preemptive exercise equilibrium, simul-
taneous exercise equilibrium and sequential ex-
ercise equilibrium. In other words, for any agent 
i, there are three possible strategies to choose in 
competitive equilibriums: he may undertake de-
velopment for his pre-existing building earlier, 
as a leader, than his competitor; wait until his 
competitor has carried out a development action, 
as a follower; or exercise his development option 
with his competitor simultaneously. We solve the 
optimal decision problem for agent i in the bench-
mark setting using a backward induction process 
as in a dynamic game. We first allow for the in-
vestment choice and threshold of his being a fol-
lower, and then take into account the case where 
this agent becomes a leader. When both agents 
develop their buildings simultaneously, it is easy 
to show that their respective investment option 
values will actually be the same as those of their 
being followers, respectively.
for expositional convenience, suppose that the 
other agent j, j∈{1, 2} but j i≠ , decides to become a 
leader and has begun developing her building first. 
In this case, agent i will choose to be the follower 
and receive the duopoly rent of ( )( ) ( ) 2iX t Y t D  by 
(2) after exercising his development option. let 
( , )i iF X Y denote the value function of agent i as 
the follower, and then his optimal problem can be 
expressed as:
8 the existing literature on real options has demonstrat-
ed that volatility is a major concern for investors in 
making investment decisions (e.g., Bulan et al. 2009), 
so our model also pays special attention to the impor-
tant implications of expected distinct volatilities as well 
as expected different growth rates.
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X s s D e ds e I
, (5)
where: *ifT denotes the follower’s optimal invest-
ment time, and r denotes the risk-free rate, which 
satisfies i ir c> µ + α + ρσ  to ensure the exercise of 
his development option within a finite period of 
time.
for simplicity, let ( ) ( ) ( )iX t Y t t= η  where η can 
be interpreted as the joint demand for these two 
buildings in the real estate market. a greater value 
of η could indicate a larger joint demand for these 
two buildings. Since the follower faces the prob-
lem of choosing his optimal investment strategy, 
let *ifη represent his optimal investment threshold. 
following Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 6), we 
can obtain the following investment opportunity 





















β  η η < η β − η  η = 
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− η ≥ η
− α − µ − ρσ
, (6)
where: the constant iβ is the positive root of the fol-
lowing quadratic equation10:
2 21 1( ) ( 1)
2 2
( ) 0.
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α + µ + ρσ β − =
 (7)




















can be interpreted in terms of tobin’s 








ifη < η , (6) suggests that agent i will continue to 
wait for the optimal investment threshold *ifη . 
9 By Itô’s lemma, we can find that the sto-
chast ic  process iXY evolves in the form of 
( ) 2 2 2i i i i i i idXY c XY dt c c XY dZ= µ + α + ρσ + σ + + ρσ , where Z is a 
standard Brownian process. That is, iXY  follows a geo-
metric Brownian motion. So, it is easy to show that the 
expected present value of the rent flow ( )( ) ( ) 2iX t Y t D can 
be written as ( ) ( )2 i iD r cη − α − µ − ρσ .
10 In equation (7), if both agents have different perspec-
tives on the expected growth and standard deviation 
of demand shocks for agent 2’s building, the two solu-
tions of 1β  may be different from those of 2β .
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When η  reaches the threshold *ifη , it is optimal 
for this agent to exercise his option at once as a 
follower.
conditional on the follower’s optimal invest-
ment choice, we can further take the leader’s in-
vestment strategies into account. In the case of 
preemptive exercise equilibrium, both agents have 
an incentive to take preemptive action to become 
a leader. that is, if neither of agents has obvious 
advantages in their competition, either of them is 
likewise likely to preempt the competition in order 
to obtain a first-mover advantage. Thus, the value 
of the investment opportunity, piL , of a preemptive 
leader, say agent i, can be expressed as:
( )
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where: ilT  is the leader’s preemptive investment 
time.
Since our model allows both demand shocks to 
follow their respective Brownian motions, we can 
derive the following value function for the preemp-
tive leader i (see Supplementary appendix a):























 η − η
− + η η < η − α − µ − ρσ − α − µ − ρσ ηη = 
η − η ≥ η − α − µ − ρσ (10)
given that the initial level of η  is sufficiently 
low, it is easy to understand that if being the fol-
lower for one agent will be more profitable, then 
this agent will not choose to enter the real estate 
market earlier as a leader. this implies that the 
preemptive investment threshold *ipη  should be de-
termined by the relationship ( ) ( )p iiL Fη = η . that 
is, at the preemptive threshold the agent will be 
indifferent between leading or following, while 
the preemptive investment time ilT might not be 
an optimal investment time. Specifically, if the 
initial level of η is lower than *ipη , the preemp-
tive leader will choose to wait until the threshold 
*
ipη is reached. If *ipη ≥ η , the leader will adopt a 
preemptive action immediately to obtain the mo-
nopoly rent of ( )( ) ( ) 1iX t Y t D , thus generating a 
preemptive exercise equilibrium. However, when 
the follower enters this market, the leader will 
only receive the duopoly rent of ( )( ) ( ) 2iX t Y t D . the 
first line of equation (10) shows the preemptive 
leader’s value function in these two cases. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that if the initial level of η  
is higher than the follower investment threshold
*
jfη , both agents will exercise their development 
options immediately, resulting in a simultaneous 
exercise equilibrium.
In the case of sequential exercise equilibrium, 
one agent, say agent i, invests earlier as a domi-
nant leader, while the other has no incentive to 
become the leader. the dominant leader’s invest-
ment opportunity value, diL , actually consists of 
two components, the monopoly option value and 
the negative impact of his competitor’s entry into 
the market. agent i will undertake his develop-
ment optimally at the moment the dominant 
threshold *idη  is reached, and will receive the mo-
nopoly rent of ( )( ) ( ) 1iX t Y t D . the negative effect of 
the follower’s option exercise on the leader’s payoff 
is ( ) ( )( (2) (1))iX t Y t D D− . In this equilibrium, the 
value function of the dominant leader can be writ-
ten as (see Supplementary appendix a):
( ) ( )
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expression (11) suggests that if the initial lev-
el of η  is smaller than *idη , the dominant leader 
will not exercise his development option until the 
optimal investment threshold *idη  is reached. If 
* *
id jfη ≤ η < η , the dominant leader will exercise his 
investment option immediately to obtain the mo-
nopoly rent of ( )( ) ( ) 1iX t Y t D , resulting in a sequen-
tial exercise equilibrium. When the follower exer-
cises her development option at the optimal thresh-
old *jfη , the monopoly rent the leader receives will 
be reduced to the duopoly rent of ( )( ) ( ) 2iX t Y t D . In 
this case, the value of the dominant leader is ac-
tually the same as that of the preemptive leader, 
so their value functions have the same expression 
as shown in the first line of (10). However, if the 
initial level of η  is larger than ( )* *max ,if jfη η , both 
the leader and the follower will exercise their de-
velopment options simultaneously, and a simulta-
neous exercise equilibrium will therefore happen.
furthermore, we can derive the following prop-
osition on preemptive investment.
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Proposition 1: Suppose that agents 1 and 
2 have the same expectation on the growth and vol-
atility of demand shocks for building 2. If * *if jfη ≥ η , 
there must exist a preemptive threshold for agent 
j; However, if * *if jfη < η , agent i needs to allow for 
the preemptive action of agent j if and only if the 











β β − η −








Proof: see Supplementary appendix B.
this proposition allows for the existence condi-
tions of asymmetric preemption. the left-hand side 
of inequality (13) represents both agents’ follower 
threshold ratio. this suggests that when * *if jfη < η  
and if the follower threshold ratio satisfies the 
inequality (13), there must exist a preemptive 
investment threshold for agent j. If the follower 
threshold ratio is smaller, this means that agent 
i’s follower threshold *ifη relative to agent j’s *jfη
increases, or vice verse *jfη relative to *ifη becomes 
smaller. the parameter x reflects the relative sup-
ply conditions of the monopoly and duopoly states. 
When the preemptive threshold is crossed, agent j 
may take a preemptive action immediately. How-
ever, if the inequality does not hold, the value of 
being a preemptive leader for this agent is lower 
than that of being a follower. the best strategic 
choice for agent j is to wait until agent i has under-
taken his development and then exercise her op-
tion as the follower. However, if *ifη  is not smaller 
than *jfη , there always exists a preemptive thresh-
old for agent j.
further, we also have the following proposition 
concerning the preemptive and sequential exercise 
equilibrium.
Proposition 2: Suppose that agents 1 and 
2 have the same expectation on the growth and 
volatility of demand shocks for building 2. When 
* *











β β − η −
<  β −η  
 (14)
holds, there respectively exist the preemptive 
thresholds for both agents i and j. However, when 
* *











β β − η −
>  β −η  
 (15)
holds, agent i is dominant in their competition and 
there therefore exists a sequential exercise equilib-
rium for both agents.
Proof: see Supplementary appendix c.
according to Proposition 2, if inequality (14) 
holds, both agents i and j have their respective 
preemptive thresholds. this suggests that both 
agents’ follower threshold ratio still plays an im-
portant role in determining the preemptive ex-
ercise equilibrium. Specifically, it can be shown 
that if * *ip jpη < η  and when the initial level of η  
is sufficiently low, agent i will begin development 
once *ipη  is reached, and agent j is willing to be a 
follower and wait until *jfη  is reached. However, 
if the initial level of η  exceeds *jfη , the optimal 
strategy for both agents can be realized via their 
immediate simultaneous exercise. on the contrary, 
if * *ip jpη > η , agent j will carry out a preemptive ac-
tion the first moment that *jpη is exceeded.
Furthermore, this proposition also specifies the 
existence conditions of sequential exercise equilib-
rium. Inequality (15) ensures not only the exist-
ence of *ipη  but also the absence of *jpη . that is, 
there is only one preemptive threshold for these 
two agents. In this case, agent j will choose to wait 
until the agent i has exercised his option, because 
the value of being the leader for agent j will be 
smaller than the value of being the follower. this 
implies that agent i has a dominant advantage in 
the competition relative to his competitor. If the 
initial level of η  is lower than *idη , agent i will ex-
ercise his option immediately once *idη  is reached, 
and then agent j will begin development when *jfη  
is crossed. this means that both agents will carry 
out their developments according to a sequential 
exercise equilibrium. However, if the initial level 
of η  is larger than ( )* *max ,if jfη η , both agents will 
exercise their investment options simultaneously.
4. HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS IN 
DUOPOLY MARKET
this section integrates heterogeneous expectations 
on the demand shocks for building 2 into the model 
developed above, where both the initial level of η  
and the three types of investment thresholds have 
been identified to matter in determining our stra-
tegic exercise equilibriums. Similar to Kogan et al. 
(2006), the two market agents are assumed not to 
differ in their preferences but in their available 
information and demand expectations. Suppose 
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that agent 2 holds all relevant information about 
the demand for his own building and can therefore 
form a rational expectation concerning its demand 
shocks. We therefore set 2α = α  and 2c c= by 
dropping the subscript 2 for convenience. In con-
trast, however, we allow agent 1 to make an irra-
tional expectation about her competitor’s building 
demand utilizing her limited information about the 
demand shocks, therefore implying that 1α  and 1c
might be different from α  and c , respectively. We 
will discuss our model implications in two typical 
cases: 1α ≠ α and 1c c= , 1α = α and 1c c≠ , respec-
tively. let **1fη , **1pη , and **1dη  denote agent 1’s follow-
er, preemptive and dominant investment threshold 
under the parameters 1α and 1c , respectively. that 
is, they all represent the investment thresholds 
driven by agent 1’s irrational expectations. as for 
the case of 1α ≠ α  and 1c c= , we can obtain the 
following proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose that agents 1 and 2 
have different expectations on the growth of de-
mand shocks for agent 2’s building, while they 
still have the same expectation on the volatility 
of the shocks. For **1 1 1 / (2)f I Dη < β ∆ , if 1α > α , 
then agent 1’s optimal follower threshold satisfies 
the relationship ** *1 1f fη < η , and vice versa11. How-
ever, if **1 1 1 / (2)f I Dη > β ∆ , 1α < α can also lead to 
** *
1 1f fη < η , and vice versa.
Proof: see Supplementary appendix D.
P r o p o s i t i o n  3  s h o w s  t h a t  g i v e n 
**
1 1 1 / (2)f I Dη < β ∆ , when agent 1 has a higher 
expectation on the growth of demand shocks for 
agent 2’s building than expected rationally by 
agent 2, this agent will have a lower follower in-
vestment threshold than agent 2 rationally ex-
pects. In other words, if the irrational expectation 
on the demand growth of the building is taken into 
account and if the initial level of η  is sufficiently 
low, this agent might exercise his development op-
tion earlier as the follower than expected ration-
ally by agent 2. this implies that the irrational 
expectation matters and might speed up the fol-
lower’s investment action12.
11 It is noteworthy that in this proposition, 2β = β  and 
( )
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2
c r c c ∆ = ∆ = α + µ − σ − + σ + + ρσ  
.  
We drop the subscript 2 from these two variables in 
that agent 2’s perspective on the expected growth is 
determined by the real market conditions.
12 Since 
iXY  follows a geometric Brownian mo-tion as shown earlier, by Wong (2007) and lin 
(2006, chapter 4) one can find that agent 1’s ex-
pected time to exercise her option relative to an in-
vestment threshold such as **
1fη  
can be expressed as
on the contrary, it is easy to understand that 
if 1α < α , agent 1 would have a higher follower 
threshold than agent 2 rationally expects. that 
is, if agent 1 expects a lower growth of demand 
shocks for agent 2’s building and if the initial level 
of η  is sufficiently low, agent 1 might undertake 
her development later than agent 2 rationally ex-
pects. In other words, the irrational expectation 
might make the follower postpone her investment.
The previous section has identified three cate-
gories of competitive equilibriums. for these three 
equilibriums, it can be shown by Propositions 1 
and 2 that agent 1’s entry thresholds should sat-
isfy the following order of relative magnitude:
* * *
1 1 1p d fη < η < η . (16)
When the effect of irrational expectation is 
taken into consideration, (16) can be rewritten as:
** ** **
1 1 1p d fη < η < η . (17)
Inequalities (16) and (17) suggest that agent 
1’s dominant investment threshold be lower than 
her follower investment threshold, otherwise this 
agent will exercise her option as the follower when 
the follower threshold is reached first. These in-
equalities also indicate that agent 1’s preemp-
tive threshold should in turn be smaller than her 
dominant investment threshold. It is easy to un-
derstand that if this agent’s dominant threshold is 
lower her preemptive threshold, she will not wait 
until a preemptive threshold is reached, because 
her dominant threshold is the optimal threshold in 
the duopoly context. this also implies the absence 
of the preemptive threshold in this case.
thus, if the initial level of η  is sufficiently 
low, one agent would preempt the competition 
first when the other has no obvious competitive 
advantage, thus resulting in a preemptive exercise 
equilibrium. If this agent has succeeded in taking 
a preemptive action, the other will have to wait 
until the optimal follower threshold is reached. In 
this case, we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose that agents 1 and 2 
have different expectations on the growth of de-
mand shocks for agent 2’s building, while they still 
have the same expectation on the volatility of the 
( )** ** 2 21 1 1 1( ) ln (0) ( ) / 2f fE T c = η η µ + α − σ +  . Without 
loss of generality, suppose that 2 21 1( ) / 2cµ + α > σ + always 
holds. It is easy to find that given **1 1 1 / (2)f I Dη < β ∆ , an 
increase in 1α  can reduce the numerator ( )**1ln (0)fη η
but raise the denominator 2 2
1 1( ) / 2c µ + α − σ +  , there-
fore accelerating this agent’s expected exercise time, all 
else being equal, and vice versa.
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shocks. Given that both *1fη and **1fη are lower than 
*
2fη , if 1α > α , then ** *1 1p pη < η , and vice versa.
Proof: see Supplementary appendix e.
given that the initial level of η  is sufficiently 
low, this proposition suggests agent 1 might have a 
lower preemptive threshold than expected ration-
ally by agent 2, if this agent’s expectation satisfies 
1α > α . In other words, the irrational expectation 
on the growth of demand shocks might distort this 
agent’s behavior in the real estate market and fur-
ther speed up or delay the supply of this market.
However, it is noteworthy that grenadier (1996) 
defines overbuilding as the recession-induced con-
struction boom in the simultaneous exercise equi-
librium. even though both agents are identical and 
symmetric in a duopoly context, grenadier find 
that strategic market competition can result in the 
overbuilding phenomenon in the face of plummeting 
demand of real estate markets, due to their avoid-
ing the problem of preemption. Similar to grena-
dier (1996), to examine this phenomenon we sup-
pose that the initial level of η is greater than both 
agents’ follower thresholds, and we can therefore 
take account of a category of equilibriums where one 
agent will exercise the option to develop immediate-
ly as soon as the demand η  falls to ** *1 1max( , )f fη η
. It is easy to show that if ** * *1 1 2f f fη > η > η and when 
η  drops to the follower threshold **1fη , agent 1’s 
option exercise will happen earlier than expected 
rationally by her competitor owing to fear of being 
preempted.13 the inequality ** * *1 1 2f f fη > η > η indi-
cates that agent 2’s follower investment threshold 
is lower than agent 1’s rational follower threshold, 
which is in turn smaller than her follower threshold 
driven by an irrational demand expectation. this 
implies that when facing the falling market de-
mand, the irrational expectation can also speed up 
the supply of the real estate market. that is to say, 
it might also lead to the overbuilding phenomenon 
in the market14.
13 It is noteworthy that by lin (2006: 127, chapter 4), since 
the initial demand level has exceeded the follower in-
vestment threshold in this case, agent 1’s expected time 
to exercise the option of investment can be obtained 
as ( )** ** 2 21 1 1 1( ) ln (0) ( ) / 2f fE T c = η η µ + α − σ +  . according 
to proposition 3, if **1 1 1 / (2)f I Dη < β ∆ , one may find that 
**
1 1( ) 0fE T a∂ ∂ >  can be satisfied, and a decrease in 1
α
 
therefore can speed up agent 1’s expected exercise time.
14 It is noteworthy that when real estate markets are 
perfectly competitive, the potential of rcBs will dis-
appear as shown in grenadier (1996). However, real 
estate markets can be characterized as oligopolistic 
competition in many countries, because a few large 
powerful developers play dominant roles in real estate 
development activities in these countries (e.g., ong 
In contrast, regarding the case of 1c c≠  and 
1α = α , we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Suppose that agents 1 and 2 
have the same expectation on the growth of demand 
shocks for agent 2’s building, while they have dif-





, if 1c c< , agent 1’s follower thresh-
old satisfies ** *1 1f fη < η , and vice versa.
Proof: see Supplementary appendix f.
this proposition suggests that if agent 1 believes 
that there is a smaller volatility of demand shocks 




, this agent 
will have a lower follower threshold than expected 
rationally by agent 2. If the initial level of η is suffi-
ciently low as well, agent 1 might prefer to exercise 
her option earlier as the demand approaches **1fη , 
because a smaller volatility 1c can reduce **1( )fE T  
given in footnote 12. this implies that an irrational 
expectation on the volatility might also distort this 
agent’s investment decisions and therefore hasten 
the supply in the real estate market.
However, if the initial level of η  is higher than 
agent 1’s follower threshold **1fη , this agent is also 
likely to exercise her development option earlier to 
avoid being preempted than expected rationally by 
her competitor as the demand gradually drops to 
the follower threshold **1fη . We still consider the 
case of ** * *1 1 2f f fη > η > η , implying that agent 1’s fol-
lower threshold **1fη driven by an irrationally ex-
pected demand volatility is the highest among these 
three follower thresholds. this suggests that we 
can consider again the set of equilibrium strategies 
that agent 1 preempts her rival when the demand 
η  falls to the follower threshold **1fη . In this case, 
fear of being preempted can make agent 1 exercise 
earlier the option to develop than expected ration-
ally, therefore leading to the oversupply of real es-
tate following the fall in the market demand.15 this 
et al. 2003; coiacetto 2009; lai et al. 2004). coiacetto 
(2009) systematically addresses the major reasons 
why many real estate markets are dominated by a 
few large developers. Thus, our findings on overbuild-
ing can still provide new insights into the effects of 
irrational expectations on real estate development ac-
tivities and have important implication for the real 
estate development industry.
15 as shown in footnote 13, agent 1’s expect-
ed exercise time in this case can be obtained as 
( )** ** 2 21 1 1 1( ) ln (0) ( ) / 2f fE T c = η η µ + α − σ +  . thus, ac - 







1 1( ) 0fE T c∂ ∂ < can be met, and an increase 
in
1c therefore can raise this agent’s investment threshold 
and in turn accelerate his expected exercise time.
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implies that an irrationally expected demand vola-
tility may also result in the phenomenon of over-
building in the market.
In addition, let **1dη and *1dη be the dominant 
thresholds under the parameters 1α and 1c and 
under the parameters a and c, respectively. We 
have the following proposition on the sequential 
exercise equilibrium.
Proposition 6: Suppose that agents 1 and 2 
have different expectation on the growth of demand 
shocks for agent 2’s building, while they still have 
the same expectation on the volatility of the shocks. 
For **1 1 1 / (1)d I Dη < β ∆ , if 1α > α , then agent 1’s 
dominant investment threshold satisfies the re-
lationship ** *1 1d dη < η , and vice versa. However, if 
**
11 1 / (1)d I Dη > β ∆ , 1α > α can make ** *1 1d dη > η  
hold, and vice versa.
Proof: see Supplementary appendix g.
In the case of sequential exercise equilibrium, 
due to her competitive advantage, agent 1 choos-
es to exercise the development option at the op-
timal dominant threshold, whereas her competi-
tor chooses to become the follower. In Proposi-
tion 6, ** *1 1d dη < η  indicates that should agent 1 
be the dominant leader, she will have a lower 
dominant investment threshold than expected 
rationally by agent 2. that is, if agent 1 has a 
higher expectation on the demand growth for 
agent 2’s building and when **1 1 1 / (1)d I Dη < β ∆ , 
this agent’s dominant threshold will be smaller 
than agent 2 expects rationally. When the initial 
level of η  is sufficiently low, this suggests that 
agent 1 might begin development earlier in the 
sequential equilibrium than expected rationally 
by agent 2, thus accelerating the supply in the 
real estate market.
on the other hand, however, Proposition 6 
also suggests one contrary case. If agent 1 ex-
pects a higher growth of demand shocks for agent 
2’s building but when **1 1 1 / (1)d I Dη > β ∆ , this 
agent would choose a higher dominant invest-
ment threshold than expected rationally by agent 
2. these results imply that if the initial level of 
η is sufficiently low, a higher expectation on the 
demand growth might also delay the supply of the 
real estate market.
However, it is worth noting that strategic mar-
ket competition can result in development cas-
cades in real estate markets as well. grenadier 
(1996) defines the development cascade as a quick 
succession of development actions. In a sequen-
tial exercise equilibrium, strategic competition 
can make the follower invest earlier, implying the 
phenomenon of development cascade. In our case, 
if agent 2 is the dominant leader, agent 1 can only 
choose to develop as the follower in the sequential 
equilibrium. thus, according to discussion associ-
ated with propositions 3 and 5, this suggests that 
if agent 1 has a higher expected demand growth or 
a smaller expected demand volatility for agent 2’s 
building than expected rationally by agent 2, this 
agent might have a lower follower threshold, thus 
exercising her development option earlier than 
expected rationally16. this implies that irrational 
expectation on real estate demand also probably 
results in development cascade. In other words, 
development cascades can also be alternatively 
explained by irrational market expectation.
In contrast, in the case of 1c c≠  and 1α = α , 
We have the following proposition on the dominant 
equilibrium.
Proposition 7: Suppose that agents 1 and 2 
have the same perspective on the expected growth of 
demand shocks for building 2, while they have het-





, if 1c c> , there must be 
** *
1 1d dη < η , and vice versa.
Proof: see Supplementary appendix H.
Similarly to Proposition 6, Proposition 7 also 
discusses the case associated with the sequential 
exercise equilibrium, while it pays special atten-
tion to the effect of irrational expectations perti-
nent to the volatility of demand shocks for agent 
2’s building. In effect, this proposition, coupled 
with Proposition 4, shows that whether agent 1 is 






, this agent will have lower investment 
thresholds in these two cases than expected ration-
ally by agent 2. these results suggest that irra-
tional expectations on the demand volatility might 
not only cause a wait-and-see mood in real estate 
markets, but also lead to development cascades in 
these markets.
16 In grenadier (1996), to examine the development 
cascade, the initial demand level is assumed to be-
gin at a leader’s investment threshold. Similarly, let-
ting the initial demand level start at *2dη , it can be 
shown that by Wong (2007) and lin (2006, chap-
ter 4), agent 1’s expected time to exercise the op-
tion of investment as a follower can be expressed 
a s ( )** ** * 2 21 1 2 1 1( ) ln ( ) / 2f f dE T c = η η µ + α − σ +  ,  w h e r e
** *
1 2f dη > η . However, since *2dη is not associated with 
both 1α  and 1c , it is easy to find, as discussed previ-
ously, that an increase in 1α  or a decrease in 1c  can 
speed up this agent’s expected exercise time, all else 
being equal.
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5. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Irrational expectations might lead to deviations of 
real estate markets from their market fundamen-
tals. clayton (1996, 1997, 1998) show many real-
istic examples on these effects. to better examine 
the effects of irrational expectations, this section 
further investigates numerically how changes in 
two crucial parameters reflecting irrational expec-
tations, 1α  and 1c , affect the investment thresh-
olds and optimal strategies of market participants 
in the duopoly market. In other words, we attempt 
to consider a more realistic real estate example 
where developers have varying irrational expecta-
tions on the growth and volatility of real estate 
markets. We choose the input parameter values 
to reflect the real estate market practice as closely 
as possible. as discussed above, we have identi-
fied that the impacts of changes in 1α  on agent 
1’s dominant and follower investment thresholds 
are ambiguous. this is because all the two thresh-
olds consist of two components. for example, **1fη  
is composed of the tobin’s Q ratio of 1 1( 1)β β −  
and the term of 1 1( ) / (2)I r c D− α − µ − ρσ . We 
can easily find that an increase in 1α  raises the 
value of the tobin’s Q but reduces the value of 
1 1( ) / (2)I r c D− α − µ − ρσ . this implies that the ef-
fects of changes in 1α  on these investment thresh-
olds are determined by the interaction of these two 
opposite forces.
In particular, figure 1 also plots the impacts 
of increasing 1α  on all three investment thresh-
olds. It is shown that all these three thresholds 
drop with the increase of 1α  in the range from 0 
to 0.025. also, among these three thresholds, the 
variation of **1pη  is observed to be largest, imply-
ing that agent 1’s preemptive threshold is most 
sensitive to changes in the irrationally expected 
demand growth.
Similarly, we can find that the impacts of 
changes in 1c  on the agent 1’s dominant and fol-
lower investment thresholds are ambiguous as 
well, regardless of being a follower or a leader. 
However, Supplementary appendix f also shows 




is satisfied, we 
can find **1 1/ 0f c∂η ∂ > holds. Similarly, according to 






, there must be **1 1/ 0d c∂η ∂ > . further, fig-
ure 2(I) shows that when 0.5ρ = −  and 1c  increas-
es from 0.001 to 0.17, these two thresholds drop 
in 1c first and then rise gradually, exhibiting a U-
shaped pattern. also, we can identify the convexity 
of **1pη  as 1c increases. In particular, among these 
three thresholds, the variation of **1pη  is found to 
be greatest as 1c  increases in the same range. 
this implies that agent 1’s preemptive threshold 
is most sensitive to changes in the irrationally 
expected demand volatility. However, when the 
absolute value of ρ  becomes smaller and, specifi-
cally, 0.1ρ = − , figure 2(II) demonstrates that all 
these three thresholds gradually increase with the 
increase of 1c .
finally, due to the important implication of the 
correlation ρ in our numerical analysis, we also 











although the impacts of changes in ρ on the 
agent 1’s dominant and follower investment 
thresholds are ambiguous, Supplementary appen-
dix J shows that **1fη  and **1dη  will increase with 
the correlation when **1 1 / (2)f I Dη > ∆  holds. this 
indicates that higher correlation might delay or 
speed up investment exercise in these two cases.
figure 3 provides further numerical evidence 
about these effects of varying correlation. also, 
we find that among all these three thresholds, 
the variation of **1fη is largest when correlation 
varies in the same range, therefore implying the 
most sensitivity of **1fη  to changes in ρ. However, 
the variation of **1pη  is found to be smallest as ρ 
changes within the same range. these results 
are different from the impacts of those two other 
parameters identified earlier. Higher correlation 
raises the values of **1fη  and **1dη , and therefore 
fig. 1. Impacts of 1α on investment thresholds of agent 1
note: all the parameter values are set as follows: r = 
0.05, I = 100, ρ = –0.1, D(1) = 1, D(2) = 0.8, µ = 0.02, aj = 
0.01, σ = 0.2, ci = 0.1, cj = 0.1
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lowers agent 1’s investment enthusiasm in these 
two cases if the initial level of demand is suffi-
ciently low. for preemption, however, **1pη  experi-
ences the smallest change as ρ varies, because this 
agent tends to obtain a first-mover advantage in a 
successful preemptive action and the leadership in 
the competition.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
this paper investigates the effects of heterogene-
ous expectation on the strategic interaction of in-
vestment decisions between two competitive real 
estate developers in a duopoly market. our game-
theoretic option model is an extension to grenadier 
(1996) by allowing these two developers to have 
different expectations on the growth and volatil-
ity about market demand. our results show that 
these heterogeneous expectations have important 
implications for the phenomena of overbuilding 
and development cascade in real estate markets.
our model considers three categories of com-
petitive equilibriums, for which we derive the com-
petitive investors’ optimal investment thresholds 
and their investment option values. the previous 
literature such as grenadier (1996) has demon-
strated that strategic market competition can 
force rational market participants to hasten their 
investment exercise, therefore probably resulting 
in overbuilding and development cascades in real 
estate markets. We find that irrational expecta-
tions on the growth and volatility of market de-
mand might further make investors’ development 
strategies deviate from the equilibrium exercise 
strategies predicted by the standard game-theo-
retic option model. these deviations can lower or 
enhance irrational investors’ market entry thresh-
olds, therefore increasing uncertainty in real es-
tate markets. In particular, even though investors 
are of irrational expectations, we still have reasons 
to believe that they still tend to maximize their 
investment project values. as a result, irrational 
investors’ value-maximizing investment choices 
are found to matter in understanding the equi-
librium market strategies in real estate markets, 
and might further hasten their development activi-
ties and aggravate the excess supply conditions in 
these markets. Hence, our model provides another 
testable explanation about the development cas-
cade and overbuilding phenomena.
furthermore, we find that among the three 
categories of investment thresholds, preemptive 
thresholds are more sensitive to changes in ir-
rational expectations than the other categories of 
fig. 2. Impacts of 1c on investment thresholds of agent 1
note: all the parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.05, 
I = 100, D(1) = 1, D(2) = 0.8, µ = 0.02, ai = 0.01, aj = 0.01, 
σ = 0.2, and cj = 0.1.
fig. 3. Impacts of ρ on investment thresholds of agent 1
note: all the parameter values are set as follows: r = 
0.05, I = 100, D(1) = 1, D(2) = 0.8, µ = 0.02, ai = 0.01, aj = 
0.01, σ = 0.2, ci = 0.1, cj = 0.1.
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investment thresholds. The correlation coefficient 
between different demand shocks is also found 
to play an important role in determining these 
three investment thresholds, while the preemp-
tive thresholds under irrational expectation are 
less sensitive to changes in the correlation than 
those other thresholds. also, it is noteworthy that 
although our model is developed via allowing for 
strategic development decisions affected by ir-
rational expectations in real estate markets, our 
model results can also be likewise applied to inves-
tigate oversupply issues in other industries.
last but not least, our research does not at-
tempt to suggest that real estate market equilibri-
ums are driven by irrational expectations. In our 
benchmark setting, we actually still assume that 
two market agents have rational expectations in 
three competitive equilibriums, thus implying that 
our equilibriums are built on the basis of rational 
expectations. In our model, since rational expec-
tations provide a foundation for deriving equilib-
rium exercise strategies, this implies that rational 
expectations still matter in driving the equilibri-
ums of real estate markets in our analysis. De-
spite that, we have further noticed that market 
participants might have irrational expectations, 
which can generate effects on real estate markets 
and their cycles. We emphasize here that irra-
tional expectations might cause real estate mar-
kets to deviate from their equilibriums and even 
aggravate development cascade and overbuilding. 
this suggests that real estate markets still might 
be brought back by market forces to their equi-
libriums from the deviations if the expectations 
are corrected. clayton (1997, 1998) demonstrates 
that anomalies in real estate markets can partly 
be caused by irrational expectations. other stud-
ies, such as Hamilton and Schwab (1985), capozza 
and Seguin (1996) and Meese and Wallace (1994), 
also provide empirical evidence against rational 
expectations on real estate markets. these results 
imply the importance of irrational expectations in 
understanding real estate cycles.
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